Does the United States really have a systemic advantage?

Text / Sina financial opinion leader (WeChat public number kopleader) columnist Wang Wen

Francis Fukuyama wrote in the book "The End of History and the Last Man" in the early 1990s: "Humans are close to the end of the millennium, and there will be only one person left in the system. That is freedom and democracy, and this last "person" refers to the United States.

Does the United States really have a systemic advantage?

The US election of Trump's "cold" victory, the world began to ponder the US political system. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, many people mistakenly believe that the fundamental reason for the rise of the United States, especially in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, lies in the institutional advantage, that is, winning the global institutional competition with the concept of freedom and democracy. Francis Fukuyama once wrote in the book "The End of History and the Last Man" in the early 1990s: "Humans are close to the end of the millennium, and there will be only one person left in the system. That is freedom and democracy, and this last "person" refers to the United States. This trend of thought has deeply affected China's entire generation, so that Chinese public opinion is full of criticism of its "institutional problems," and some even refer to all Chinese issues as "institutions."

The theoretical misunderstanding is so deep that a new generation of Chinese scholars must clarify the relationship between "political system and the rise of the country" from the historical source of the rise of the United States. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the author went to the United States at least once a year, visited more than 10 states and dozens of counties and towns, and talked with hundreds of Americans and compiled them into a book: An American Anxiety: A Think Tank Scholars' research on the United States, this question has been the main line of thinking entangled in the mind.

The real logic of the rise of the United States

The so-called "institutional advantage" is a fairly simple understanding of the rise of the United States. In the inertia of thinking, it seems to explain the rise of the United States from a small country to a global power between the publication of the Declaration of Independence in the late 18th century and the end of the Cold War at the end of the 20th century. The logic has become dumb for the fact that the United States’ national strength has been relatively weak for more than 20 years: Why does the same political system, in the context of the United States gaining unprecedented international advantages, cannot guarantee the continued strength of American power?

The establishment of a democratic system in the United States is not a "live", but a long process of evolution. According to the statistics of the famous American political scientist Thomas Dey, at least 45 of the 55 US founding priests who participated in the revision of the Federal Constitution in 1787 held state bonds, 14 engaged in land speculation, and 24 people lending and investing. 11 people are engaged in trade and manufacturing, 35 are slave owners, and 15 people have a large number of plantations. At the time, the vast majority of the 4 million citizens in the United States were small farmers, debtors, small traders, farmers in remote areas, service providers and even slaves. In the eyes of Dey, the United States has always been controlled by a small group of people rather than the general public.

Since then, the US Constitution has undergone 27 amendments, which complemented the seams of the founding sages who first determined the rules of freedom and democracy, continued the vitality of the system, and shaped the attraction of the system. But these 27 valid amendments, the first 10 amendments were passed at one time, the other 17 amendments have experienced difficult games, and some amendments have even been discussed for more than 200 years. On the one hand, this process is accompanied by the respect of the rights of people outside the elite. From the abolition of serfdom in the United States in 1861 until the black liberation movement led by Martin Luther King in the 1960s, black talents gradually enjoyed the equality of democracy. right. On the other hand, the revision of the US Constitution is also full of struggle and blood. The country experienced one civil war, four presidential assassinations, dozens of periodic economic and financial crises, and hundreds of ethnic conflicts. In the United States, in the 1890s, the industrial production and GDP gradually surpassed the old global hegemonic power of the United Kingdom. Gradually become the world's number one power.

From this point of view, the growth of the national strength of the United States, along with the history of the reform of a political system, is a history of social equality and ethnic resistance. The reform of the system has promoted the rise of the United States, and the rising United States has continuously enhanced the international appeal of its political system. From this perspective, the so-called "first system, then rising" is a simple and dogmatic misleading.

Of course, with institutional changes, there is no need for a national rise. France has experienced several rounds of institutional changes since the 18th century. It has experienced five republic systems and two imperial systems, but it has never been the world's number one power. The reason is that France has not grasped well in several major competitions. Strategic opportunities, but the rise of the United States is an exception.

From an international perspective, the rise of the United States can be roughly divided into three stages: First, the strength is gradually increasing. The "Monroe Doctrine" launched in the early 19th century laid the foundation for the United States to monopolize the Americas, forcing European powers to fight away from North America. The United States was able to take a sigh of relief and recuperate. Although it had a civil war in the 1860s, it enjoyed the "isolationism dividend" of European powers and the "global trade dividend" of the initial globalization. In the 19th century, the European continent experienced at least eight wars. There was a large-scale war between almost every group of powers, and the industrialization of the United States was carried out in a peaceful environment.

The second is to take advantage of the period. The two world wars in the first half of the last century have uplifted the status of the United States in disguise. The fratricidal killings of the European powers in the First World War made the United States finally profitable. In February 1922, the "United States, Britain, France, Japan and Japan on the Treaty of Restriction of the Navy", the "National Five-Nation Treaty" signed, made the British officially recognized the US-British Navy. The principle of reciprocity of power marks the end of Britain's maritime superiority, and the United States becomes a military equal in peace with the United Kingdom. Then, the "gold standard" led by the British pound gradually disintegrated. In World War II, the Soviet Union died more than 20 million people, Germany more than 3 million, Britain more than 4.5 million, Italy more than 4 million, other small countries add up to more than 40 million, Europe has almost become ruins. After 1941, the United States, like the latter part of World War I, once again took the opportunity to intervene and "save" the world. After World War II, the United States launched the "Marshall Plan" to rebuild the world order and lay down hegemony. At that time, US GDP, industrial production, and gold reserves once accounted for more than 60% of the world. The design of all international systems was based on the interests of the US national interests.

The third is the hegemonic protection period. Professor Qin Yaqing fully discussed in the book Hegemony System and International Conflicts that the fundamental national interest of the United States in the post-war international system is to maintain hegemonic powers relative to other countries in the international system, especially major challenge countries or potential challenge countries. The dominant power position is to protect the hegemonic position. In short, after World War II, the United States encountered challenges in Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union politically, economically, and militarily, but the latter three all fell short. After the 1990s, the world finally presented a situation of “one super-dominant”.

China can draw nutrition from the logic of the rise of the United States

Michael H. Hunt, a famous American professor of history, explains why the United States can achieve hegemony in the book "The United States is the One World", that is, the accumulation of wealth, the belief or mission of the nation, and a strong, modern Government. With this basic condition, along with the changes in the current situation, the successive leaders of the United States have combined the national aspirations with material resources and steadily put the United States on a dominant international status in the world. In nearly 400 pages of books, Han De almost did not mention the "political system advantage" that China's domestic public opinion pays attention to, but attributed the rise of the country more to the "system" opposite: "people" and related Operational effort. Professor Han De’s summary is consistent with my years of experience in US research. As this "America's Anxiety" shows in many personal stories, many times I realize that it is not the so-called American institutional advantage, but rather the condolences and dilemmas of their so-called "institutional design."

For example, the Americans are most familiar with the US leader selection system. After three rounds of presidential elections, I have earnestly felt that the leaders of the US system selection do not depend first on whether candidates have the ability to lead the country, or whether they have sufficient governance experience, and often are candidates’ lobbying. The ability to speak and fundraise, especially the successive US presidents in the information age after the 1980s, the first quality requirement was actually "playing"! The elected president is either an actor, such as Reagan, or a good speaker, such as Clinton and Obama. In the 2016 general election, whether it is Hillary or Trump, the performance of "play" is even worse.

It is this kind of "institutional paradox" - on the one hand, the reform of the system constantly requires the equalization of the empowerment of the people, that is, everyone needs equal votes and determines the final vesting of the state leaders; on the other hand, the selected objects need Catering to the public's orientation, it is difficult for those true political masters, strategists or those with great politicians to stand out – eventually bringing the entire United States into endless anxiety and confusion, and the country and society are becoming more and more separatist. The decline of the country has also become inevitable.

In my opinion, the three important reasons for the rise of the United States are dying: the natural geopolitical advantage of the United States is dying. In the 19th century, through various means such as purchase, deception, and occupation, the United States created the geostrategic position of the world's most high-quality power with "the east is the ocean, the north and the south are weak countries." However, the trend of informationization, Internetization, and supersonicization in the 21st century has made the United States and the rest of the world "zero-distance", which makes the United States "slightly" like the first half of the last century, even powerful. The chances of winning the "cheap" style are getting smaller and smaller. In fact, during Obama’s administration, there was an “isolationist” diplomatic trend in the United States, but the United States could not be isolated from the rest of the world, nor could it not be able to deal with the regional problems that had caused itself to deteriorate. The world where extremism and terrorism prevail is unique. As American scholar David Mason said in the book "The End of the American Century," excessive expansion has cost the Americans a lot. Gradually, Eisenhower’s American prophecy is emerging: “We will be self-destructive in the search for absolute security and vain.” Of course, the "destruction" here means that the United States is no longer so powerful.

The ability of the United States to capture historical opportunities is dying. Every time the historical opportunity comes, whether it is the American civil war or the two world wars, the United States is very good at grasping the gap. At the point where there may be strategic errors, avoid making mistakes and not letting fleeting opportunities disappear. After the end of the Second World War, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union made strategic mistakes in domestic politics and economy. The US strategists and decision-makers seized the flaws of their competitors and carried out a powerful strategic counterattack, successfully maintaining the hegemony of the United States. However, after the end of the Cold War, this talent of the United States seems to have been given to God. The American great strategist Brzezinski used "the lack of strategic understanding and world leadership" in his book "Second Opportunity" in 2008. "The lame performance of power" is to describe the three presidents of Clinton and Bush and Bush. It is a pity that Obama did not seize the "second opportunity" that Brine said. In the face of the global "political awakening", American leadership is really "catastrophic."

Third, the absolute advantage of American snares and the cultivation of talents is dying. Although the United States still leads the world in talent attraction, according to a large amount of data from American scholar David Mason, the declining education is becoming an important reason for the decline of US competitiveness and international prestige. In the 2016 US presidential election, Trump's hot, "socialist" Sanders has long been with Hillary, the reason behind this is the rise of populism. The basis of populism is the decline in the level of education and literacy of Americans, and the resulting lack of rationalism. There is a lot of evidence that in the last century, the pragmatism, entrepreneurship, efficiency, technological innovation, and scientific research investment in the United States are retreating relative to other powerful countries. Some individual indicators even lag behind emerging countries such as India and China. When I was researching in South Korea, I learned that the number of young people studying in South Korea in China exceeded the number of students studying in the United States for the first time in 2014. This also reflects the decline of American education from one aspect.

Looking at the United States, we must adhere to the Chinese standard.

From these dying "rises of power", we can truly assess the role of institutions in the development of the United States. Twenty years after the publication of the "final conclusion of history", Fukuyama re-examines "political order and political decline" and comprehensively rethinks and corrects the previous theory. This reflects the so-called "system superiority theory" that some Chinese people have outlined for the United States. It is the theoretical boastfulness, self-confidence and conceit that emerges from the "final conclusion of history".

More than 200 years of American political history is actually a history of institutional development. These include institutional debates at the end of the 18th century, serfdom discussions in the mid-19th century, progressive movements at the beginning of the last century, democratic self-confidence at the end of the last century, and democratic reflections at the beginning of the 21st century. To truly assess the status of the US system is not to deny American democracy, but to rethink the significance of the political system to the rise of the country.

Transcending "institutional determinism" is a kind of negative thinking logic, and then dialysis to support the momentum of the United States to maintain its long-term advantage. This will not only enhance the confidence of Chinese society, but also provide new lessons for the continued promotion and maintenance of China's rising energy. In short, China's geographical disadvantage compared with the United States is no longer so obvious. The new Asia-Europe geopolitics created by the “Belt and Road” is becoming a new driving force for China's development. On this basis, China grasps opportunities externally. To cultivate talents internally, the rising momentum will remain for a long time.

Looking at the anxiety of Americans and American society, it is not only an important perspective to observe the domestic political changes and changes in foreign policy, but more importantly, to promote others and people themselves, from the anxiety of the United States, to the support of the country. The secret of development. This is also the starting point for the theme of this book as "American anxiety."

From the 1784 US "China Queen" to China, the relationship between the oldest countries on both sides of the Pacific and the youngest countries began. How to handle the relationship between the two countries has always been one of the most important bilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific status. However, for China, “how to look at the United States” is always a difficult target to calibrate. In particular, it is necessary to abandon the two types of thinking dimensions of “beautification” and “surprise” as much as possible.

The so-called "beautification" began with the Chinese translation of the United States of America. China has more than 60 translations of the United States, such as the United States, the United States, the United States, and the like, and finally chose to use the "beautiful country" to define, how much reflects the Chinese people's fascination with the United States. The result of obsession is disappointment. In the early years of the Republic of China, China once adopted a system similar to the separation of powers in the United States, but it quickly failed. During the May Fourth Movement, President Wilson was the hope of Chinese young students, but the Paris Peace Conference made the Chinese wake up; 1945 The Chinese believe that the United States will really mediate, but in the end it is "Don't, Stuart". From the historical experience, it is only possible for China to "beautify" and "de-Americanize" to see the United States, and it is possible to draw more objective results.

The so-called "surprise" refers to the complete disparity between the social system, ideology, and way of life of China and the United States, and regards China and the United States as two distinct civilization systems. This has led the Chinese to see the "polarization" of the United States. First, they are moving closer to the United States. They even advocate politically, economically and socially to become a country like the United States. Second, they must maintain independence and uniqueness relative to the United States. So that every time the United States is right, it is against the United States. This makes the United States often linger on both ends of the Chinese world view, but the dots are not found.

Over the past 30 years, China’s development has actually gone relatively "de-Americanized" while at the same time drawing on the reform path of American experience. On the basis of extensive public consultation and publicity, China has promoted grassroots elections, off-site appointments, civil service promotion, and collective leadership, and gradually formed a political system reform with its own characteristics.

The United States remains the world's number one power, but it does not mean that China is still completely behind the United States. Compared with the United States, China's position in each field is not the same, and some have surpassed the United States, such as total industrial output and trade volume. As mentioned in this book, the gap between China and the United States has the least economic strength; the education and science and technology strength is second, and the catch-up trend is very obvious; the biggest gap is the strength of military and financial. But transcending the United States is not an end. Finding the gist of China’s development from the perspective of the United States is the so-called true mission of scholars.

From this point of view, it is even more necessary to apply the old saying: the revolution has not yet succeeded, and comrades still have to work hard.

(The author of this article: Executive Dean of Chongyang Financial Research Institute of Renmin University of China, near "The illusion of a big country: a diary and reflection on the world.")